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THE TONY BLAND CASE
MOIRA M. MCQUEEN* & JAMES L. WALSH**
INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 1989, Tony Bland's ("Bland") lungs were crushed and
punctured at the Hillsborough soccer disaster in Liverpool, England,'
leaving him in a persistent vegetative state ("PVS"). 2 Before incurring
this injury, Bland did not indicate what treatment he should receive if
left in such a condition. After medical diagnoses predicted he had no
chance of recovery,3 Bland's family and doctors sought permission to dis-
* LL.B., 1967, University of Glasgow, Scotland; M.Div., 1989, Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of
Theology, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto.
** Congregation of St. Basil; Faculty of Theology, University of St. Michael's College, To-
ronto; S.T.D. [Lateran] 1965; S.T.L. [Gregorian) 1962.
1 See Steve Lohr, 93 Are Dead After a Crush at Soccer Game in England, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1989, at 12 (describing riot as worst tragedy in history of British soccer); Soccer Game
Stampede Kills 93, More than 200 Hurt at Match in England, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.
16, 1989, at 1A.
2 See FRED PLUM & JEROME POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 6 (3d ed. 1980).
The persistent vegetative state ("PVS") has been described as a return to wakefulness after
a coma, but without any cognitive functioning whatsoever. Id. There is continued preser-
vation of automatic or vegetative functioning (i.e., heartbeat, digestion, and respiration)
with a complete lack of higher thought processes. Id.
3 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 2 W.L.R. 316 (C.A. 1993). "There is no hope whatsoever
of recovery of any kind. That is the unanimous opinion of all the distinguished doctors who
have examined Anthony Bland [("Bland")]." Id. at 322.
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continue his life-sustaining treatments, including his artificial nutrition
and hydration.4
The public response to the decision by Bland's family and doctors
was mixed. One editorial in a British religious journal, The Tablet,
voiced concern over the withdrawal of all support from patients who
were not dying.5 In addition, Archbishop Winning of Glasgow stated
that the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration would be equivalent to
the "intentional killing by starvation."6 Others viewed Bland's case as
the first step toward an acceptance of euthanasia.7 Conversely, Bryan
Jennett, a neurologist well-experienced in working with PVS patients,
argued that such patients should be allowed to die.
8
Three different courts held that the withdrawal of all life support
from Bland was permissible.9 Thus, several weeks after Airedale N.H.S.
Trust v. Bland was decided by the House of Lords, Bland died peacefully
shortly after his life support was removed. 10 R.I.P.
Part I of this Article analyzes the legal basis of the Bland decision.
Part II explores the ethical issues arising from Bland and concludes that
the legal basis used in situations similar to that of Bland should be al-
tered to encompass the ethical distinction between "willing" that some-
one die and "intending" someone's death.
I. LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES USED BY THE BLANVD COURTS
The law lords hearing Bland used three legal and ethical principles
as a basis for their findings: (i) the sanctity of life; (ii) the autonomy of
the patient; and (iii) the duty of care.
4 See id. at 321 (detailing Bland's treatment as including artificial mechanical feeding
through nasogastric tube, four to five hours of care each day by two nurses, and assistance
with all bodily functions).
5 THE TABLET, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1495-96, 1520.
6 Id.
7 See Jeremy Laurance, Judgement Affects 1,000 Patients, THE TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 3.
One doctor points out that the medical community may not have enough experience in this
area, leading to negative evaluations of patient status. Id. He argues that patients should
be given the chance to live before they are given the chance to die. Id.; see generally James
Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, Perspectives on Cruzan: The Sirens Lure of Invented Consent: A
Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decisionmaking for Legally-Incapacitated Older
Persons, 42 Hastings L.J. 779 (1991).
8 See Bryan Jennett, Letting Vegetative Patients Die, BRITISH MEDICAL JoumAL 1305-06
(Nov. 28, 1992).
9 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 2 W.L.R. 322 (Fain.), affd, 2 W.L.R. 332 (C.A.), affd, 2
W.L.R. 359 (H.L.(E.) 1993).
10 See Richard Ford & Paul Wilkinson, Tony Bland to Be Allowed to Die After Law Lords'
Ruling, THE TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1. Bland's father described the decision as a great relief
and in everyone's best interest, including the family and nursing staff. Id.
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A. The Sanctity of Life
Specific references to the sanctity of life were made by Lords
Keith," Goff, 2 and Browne-Wilkinson, 3 stressing its importance but
noting that the principle is not absolute. Lord Keith noted that, since
being in a PVS is not beneficial to the patient, the sanctity of life princi-
ple is qualified by the medical treatment and care of a PVS patient which
necessarily involves the "invasive manipulation" of the patient's body
without the patient's consent.' 4 However, Lord Keith's conclusion that
such treatment and care do not confer any benefit on a PVS patient is
only an opinion and requires proof.
Lord Goff stated that the sanctity of life is the fundamental legal
principle applicable to Bland.'5 He emphasized the importance of this
principle' 6 by citing its recognition in two places: (i) Article Two of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms' 7 and (ii) Article Six of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights.'" However, Lord Goff contended that this
principle is not absolute and must yield, to some extent, to the principle
of self-determination.' 9 It should be noted that the principle of self-de-
termination also overrides the third principle used in this case-the duty
of care owed by a doctor to a patient. The Canadian case Nancy B. v.
Hotel-Dieu de Quebec20 is illustrative of this point. In Nancy B., the
court held that a patient of sound mind may, if properly informed, re-
quire that life support be discontinued. 2 '
Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressed his concern that a doctor's atti-
tude toward the sanctity of life may influence the doctor's decision re-
garding whether to continue treatment.2 2 Indeed, there are conflicting
views of how to uphold the sanctity of life principle. Lord Goff suggested
11 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 362 (noting that sanctity of life principle is not absolute, while indi-
cating maintenance of sanctity of life is a concern of both state and judiciary).
12 Id. at 367 (positing that no absolute rule exists mandating prolongation of life of
patient).
13 Id. at 381 (asking what is meant by "life" in principle of sanctity of life, especially in
light of modern technological developments).
14 Id. at 362.
15 Id. at 367.
16 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 367 (suggesting that medical science deemed Bland alive, providing
application of sanctity of human life principle).
17 Id. (citing European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 1953, art. 2).
18 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 367 (citing International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
1966, art. 6).
19 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 367.
20 86 D.L.R.4th 385 (1992).
21 Id. at 395.
22 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 386.
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that when a family is dismayed by the artificial prolongation of a loved
one's life they should seek a different medical practitioner.2 3 Lord Goff
indicated earlier that "it is crucial for the understanding of this question
that the question itself should be correctly formulated."2 4
The question which must be addressed concerns whether the doctor
should continue to provide the patient with medical treatment or care
which, if continued, would prolong the patient's life.25 Yet, this is not a
question of euthanasia. The crucial question is not whether it is in the
best interest of the patient to die, since framing the issue in that manner
directly challenges the sanctity of life principle.
It is apparent that this principle is not as clear as it may appear.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson framed the issue by asking what "life" is in
terms of the current evaluation of the moral precept.2 6 Coupled with the
consideration that the taking of life through an abortion is not illegal, it
is suggested that the principle of the sanctity of life is in need of thor-
ough re-evaluation.
B. Principle of Autonomy
The fact that the sanctity of life gives way to autonomy is evidence
that, in today's world, the principle of self-determination is paramount.
However, problems arise when people are incapable of communicating
their wishes or consenting to treatment.2 7 As previously mentioned,
Bland had not expressed his wishes regarding treatment, and would be
forever incapable of doing so. In order to address situations where such
a problem exists, a combination of the principles of necessity and best
interests has developed in English law.2"
Lord Goff pointed out that it is inconsistent with the primacy given
to autonomy that the law should provide no means of enabling treatment
23 Id. at 377; cf. Brophy v. New England Sinia Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986)
(finding hospital could not be forced to discontinue treatment of PVS patient, yet had duty
to assist guardian of patient with transfer to facility where guardian's wishes would be
carried out).
24 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 371.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 381. "The physical state known as death has changed." Id. Lord Browne-Wilkin-
son maintains that in light of today's technology, the time and manner of death can often
be the product of human decisionmaking, resulting in new and more complex ethical and
social issues. Id.
27 See generally Jennifer E. Bennett Overton, Note, Unanswered Implications-The
Clouded Rights of the Incompetent Patient Under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1293 (1991); Steven M. Richard, Note, Someone Make Up My
Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients with No Prior
Expression of a Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 394 (1989).
28 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 370.
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to be withheld if a person cannot consent.29 It is established in English
law that a doctor may lawfully treat a person unable to give consent if
the doctor acts in the patient's best interests as judged by a reasonable
portion of the body of medical opinion.30 All counsel in Bland agreed
that the case of In re F3' provided guidance for the resolution of the is-
sues in Bland.32 The issue in In re F was whether it would be lawful for
doctors to sterilize an adult woman who was of unsound mind.33 The
court's parens patriae jurisdiction 34 to give consent on such person's be-
half no longer exists. 35 Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that this jurisdic-
tion was removed by the effect of the Mental Health Act of 1959 and by
the revocation of the Warrant under the Sign Manual. Both actions left
the courts with jurisdiction over the person's property but not over the
person.36 Rather than fail to provide the necessary guidance for the
medical profession, the House made a declaratory ruling that it would be
lawful for the doctors to proceed. The same type of declaratory ruling
was sought in Bland.37
The central issue surrounding Bland was whether doctors could jus-
tifiably discontinue the artificial feeding upon which Bland's life de-
pended by relying on the principle of best interests.3' The law lords
stressed the importance of accurately framing the issues to be addressed.
Courts in the United States rely on the concept of substituted judg-
ment when determining what choice a patient might have made under
29 Id. at 368; see Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977). "To presume that the incompetent person must always be subjected to what
many rational and intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the incom-
petent person by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality." Id. at
428.
30 See, e.g., In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), 2 W.L.R. 1025 (1989); T v. T and An-
other, 2 W.L.R. 189 (1988) (indicating that, in exceptional circumstances where patient is
suffering from such mental abnormality as never to be able to give consent, where no provi-
sion of law provides for consent to be given by another, medical advisor is justified in taking
such steps as good medical practice demands).
31 2 W.L.R. 1025.
32 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 373.
33 In Re F, 2 W.L.R. at 1025.
34 The parens patriae concept is an equitable doctrine which permits the state to make
decisions to protect the welfare of persons unable to do so on their own. See Lawrence B.
Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 Emory L. J. 195 (1978); see also
Joanna K. Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism, Community, and the Right
to Die: A Commentary on the New Jersey Experience, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 119, 125-30 (1988)
(discussing principles of best interests, self-determination, and parens patriae doctrine).
35 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 365, 385.
36 Id. at 385 (declaring that removal of parens patriae jurisdiction leaves court without
power to give or refuse consent on Bland's behalf).
37 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 360 (giving terms of declaration).
38 Id.
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that patient's current condition.3 9 Use of this concept may initially seem
to enhance patient autonomy by attempting to focus on what the patient
would have desired. However, critics of this approach claim it is open to
abuse or, at least, manipulation of events to achieve a desired result.
40
The English law lords agree that the "best interests principle" is a
broader and more viable principle on which to operate than the concept
of substituted judgment. Lord Mustill went so far as to dismiss substi-
tuted judgment as "simply a fiction" (not to be confused with a legal fic-
tion).4 1 He reasoned that use of this principle could in fact limit, rather
than extend, patient autonomy by emphasizing one or two comments
about future treatment, thus considering such statements out of context
when viewed in the scope of a person's entire life.4 2
The "substituted judgment" theory focuses disproportionately on the
person's statements rather than on the person's overall best interests.
The concept of "best interests," while not perfect, focuses on current and
future interests and not on past events which may be misleading.
Doctors practicing under the concept of "best interests" consider an
individual patient's best interests in accordance with a reasonable body
of good medical practice. However, doctors may disagree over what is
"reasonable" or what is "good." The "best interests" approach does have
the advantage of considering usefulness or uselessness of treatment-a
fact that presumably can be evaluated objectively. One is not left to
guess what the patient would have wanted.
Lord Mustill's judgment best reflects the confusion over the ques-
tions to be asked concerning the principle of "best interests." He wrote,
"As I understand the position [the doctors] have all, with heavy hearts,
taken the ethical decision that since their efforts have run their course it
is better from every point of view that Anthony Bland's life should be
brought to an end."4 3 This was the last judgment made, yet Lord
Browne-Wilkinson had already noted that the correct question was not
whether it was in Anthony Bland's best interests to die, but "whether it
[was] in the best interests of Anthony Bland to continue the invasive
medical care involved in artificial feeding."4 4
39 See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989) (employing substituted judg-
ment standard, rather than best interests standard, to determine when to exercise ward's
rights).
40 See generally Andrew Agrawal, In Re Conroy: Forging a Path to Death With Dignity, 67
B.U. L. REV. 365 (1987); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1121
(1991).
41 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 396.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 389.
44 Id. at 385.
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Lord Keith broadly stated that the issue is to determine "in what
circumstances, if ever, can those having a duty to feed an invalid law-
fully stop doing so."4" Lord Lowry maintained that the necessity of feed-
ing a PVS patient must be established through the best interests
argument.46
Lord Mustill moved through several arguments concerning the dis-
tinction between murder by way of an omission where a duty to act exists
and an omission where a duty to act does not exist.4 7 He noted that it
can never be said that the termination of life is in the best interests of a
person.4' He eventually suggested that the focus of the inquiry should
be the interests of the person in continuation of treatment.4 9 While this
is difficult to assess, it at least moves toward the position of the other
judges by focusing on the obligation of doctors to continue life-prolonging
treatment. The obligation to continue life-prolonging treatment is given
even greater weight in the consideration of the third principle of Bland-
the duty of care.
C. The Duty of Care
The principle of the duty of care is of great importance since breach
of the duty leaves one liable in both civil and criminal cases. Lord Lowry
noted that this is "the real point" in Bland.5 ° The Official Solicitor ar-
gued that the duty to feed a helpless person is different from the duty to
provide medical care.5 1 Although a debate exists regarding whether
feeding is part of medical treatment for PVS patients, the majority of
medical opinions conclude that it is. Lord Lowry maintained that the
position that a helpless person must be fed falsely assumes that feeding
in order to sustain life is necessarily for the benefit of the patient.5 2 This
benefit must be established, and that is precisely where the best inter-
ests approach applies. If doctors advise that it is futile to continue treat-
ment then it cannot be presumed that feeding is necessarily for the bene-
fit of the patient.
45 Id. at 360.
46 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 379.
47 Id. at 394-95.
48 Id. at 398. However, this seems to be at odds with his opinion at the beginning of his
judgment.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 378.
51 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 378 ("[The duty to feed a helpless person, such as a baby or an
unconscious patient, is something different-an elementary duty to keep the patient alive
which exists independently of all questions of treatment and which the person in charge
cannot omit to perform ... ") (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 379.
369
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Lord Lowry's remarks do not entirely clarify this point. He stated
that, "[e]ven though the intention to bring about the patient's death is
there, there is no proposed guilty act because . . . the doctor would be
acting unlawfully if he continued the care and treatment" where it is not
in the patient's best interests.5 3 Perhaps the wrong point is being con-
sidered here. Treatment is discontinued because it is futile; it is not ter-
minated in order to cause the patient's death. This is a clear example of
allowing a patient to die. There is a distinction between intending and
willing for which the law does not provide. There is no intent to cause
death, but there is a willingness to permit the person to die. Lord Goff
made a point of highlighting the distinction between intending and al-
lowing death, and it must be further emphasized so that the line between
letting one die and euthanasia remains clear.5 4
Lord Browne-Wilkinson's articulation of the doctors' duty to give or
withhold treatment also provides reason for concern. He stated that
"what is proposed in the present case is to adopt a course with the inten-
tion of bringing about Anthony Bland's death."5" Thus, he argues that
this is justifiable because the doctors are under no obligation or duty to
continue feeding. If the obligation to feed remained, the doctors would be
guilty of murder.
Lord Mustill's judgment posed the question of duty in the same man-
ner. In his opinion, "the proposed conduct has the aim... of terminating
the life of Anthony Bland by withholding from him the basic necessities
of life."56 A few paragraphs later, however, he states that cessation of
treatment will be a criminal omission only if the doctors are still under a
duty to continue treatment.5 7
Lords Lowry, Browne-Wilkinson, and Mustill all agreed that the ob-
ligation to feed Bland had disappeared since there was no hope of his
recovery. It is remarkable that, in light of this conclusion, they did not
pursue the "letting die" approach but, rather, preferred to use the "in-
tending death" approach which was not criminal since there was no fur-
ther obligation to treat. They relied on the provisions of criminal law
which draw no distinctions regarding the legality of causing death by act
or omission except where there is no duty. It is not surprising that the
lords urged the British Parliament to consider this matter and to issue
clear laws and guidelines. They clearly did not feel that their judgments
would be adequate guidance for what they consider an area of law rich
with challenge.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 368-69.
55 Id. at 383.
56 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 388.
57 Id. at 389.
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II. ETHICAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM BLAND
A. Dualism
Most of the descriptions of Bland that are dualistic in tone were
made in the lower courts. For example, it was observed that "his spirit
has left him and all that remains is the shell of his body,""s and "he has
no life in the sense that even the most pitifully handicapped but con-
scious human being has a life." 59 A careful reading of the House of Lords
judgment reveals little or nothing of dualism. Lord Mustill, however,
noted that a person "may also comprise a spiritual essence distinct from
both body and personality."60 In addressing the spiritual essence, Lord
Mustill stated that "of this we can know nothing and in particular we
cannot know whether it perishes with death or transcends it."6
Although his wording at times seems dualistic, Lord Mustill at least at-
tempted to recognize spiritual life and faith beliefs regarding the soul.
This is a difficult area all the same. Even the Roman Catholic Church,
which defines the human being as a person from conception, has diffi-
culty explaining the concept of personhood.
B. Quality of Life
Not surprisingly, the concept of quality of life was considered at sev-
eral points.62 If the best interests of a patient are going to be considered,
it is almost inevitable that this be so. Lord Browne-Wilkinson ques-
tioned whether a person has the right to be sustained when one's quality
of life is nonexistent.63 This is an important point because it emphasizes
that, not only was Bland's quality of life impaired, but his capacity for
awareness and development had been totally destroyed. He could expe-
rience neither burdens nor benefits; he could experience nothing; he was
insensate. Lord Mustill observed that any "glimmerings of awareness"
shown by patients in damaged but less extreme situations establish a
presumption of some kind of interest in life.64 Bland did not even have a
58 Airedale N.H. Trust v. Bland, 2 W.L.R. 322, 330 (Fam. 1993). "He has no feeling, no
awareness, nor can he experience anything relating to his surroundings. To his parents
and family he is 'dead.'" Id.
59 Id.
60 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 400.
61 Id.
62 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 371. Lord Goff noted that these types of cases can be grouped into
two categories. Id. According to Lord Goff, in the first category of cases, in ascertaining the
patient's best interests with regard to life sustaining treatment, the court will look to all
circumstances, including the quality of life of the patient resulting from treatment. Id. In
the second category of cases, which includes Bland, such a quality of life balancing is irrele-
vant because the patient is unconscious and there is no hope of improvement. Id.
63 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 381.
64 Id. at 400.
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"glimmering."65 The law lords relied on this objective fact, rather than
on the subjective quality of life assessments, when they considered the
futility of his treatment.
Roman Catholic teaching does not steer away from "quality of life"
arguments in every form. In addition to the "sanctity of the person" (a
more nuanced position than the sanctity of life), the capacity to actually
live one's life, and the way in which one lives one's life, are also impor-
tant considerations. Physical life, however, is not an absolute value in
the context of a belief in "eternal life." The Texas Bishops, for example,
wrote that caregivers are not abandoning a PVS patient, as is sometimes
claimed, by withdrawing nutrition and hydration. 66 They are accepting
at some point (not hastily) that "the person has come to the end of his or
her pilgrimage and should not be impeded from taking the final step."6
7
This theory views death as a step in the journey to the future which we
all eventually face, regardless of our individual beliefs.
Arguments about the quality of life were pointless in Bland since
Bland could not in any way experience his life. However, such conten-
tions are extremely important in other situations. Notwithstanding the
sanctity of life considerations, the Roman Catholic Church teaches that
there are limits on what must be done to prolong temporal life. 6s The
human good of being alive is not an absolute value.6 9 Death teaches us
that lesson even if faith does not.
65 Id. at 364. In his discussion of Bland's condition, Lord Goff noted:
The medical witnesses in this case include some of the outstanding author-
ities in the country on this condition. All are agreed on the diagnosis. All are
agreed on the prognosis also: there is no hope of any improvement or recovery.
One witness of great experience described Mr. Bland as the worst P.V.S. case
he had ever seen.
Id.
66 Texas Bishops, On Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration, 20 ORIGINS 53, 54
(1990).
67 Id.
68 See id. at 53-54. (citing Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life (Nov. 24, 1957), in 4 THE
POPE SPEAKS, at 393-98 (1958)).
The Texas Bishops noted there are three basic moral principles: 1.
Although life always is good, there are conditions which, if present, lessen or
remove one's obligation to sustain life .... 2. If the reasonable foreseen bene-
fits to the patient in the use of any means outweigh the burdens to the patient
or others, then those means are morally obligatory.... 3. If the means used to
prolong life are disproportionately burdensome compared with the benefits to
the patient, then those means need not be used, they are morally optional.
Id.
69 Texas Bishops, supra note 66, at 53-54 (stating that "the temporal concerns must al-
ways be subordinated to the patient's spiritual needs and obligations").
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C. Nutrition and Hydration as Medical Treatment
There is a debate regarding whether the nutrition and hydration of a
patient should be seen as medical treatment or, rather, whether, as
claimed by the Official Solicitor, they are "something different-an ele-
mentary duty to keep the patient alive which exists independently of all
questions of treatment and which the person in charge cannot omit to
perform."7" The latter view presumes that it is in the best interests of
the patient to be kept alive but does not prove it. Although asking why
the patient is being kept alive sounds like a "quality of life" question, we
must determine for what purpose we are doing any particular act. We
have to demonstrate a reason. Can keeping someone alive really "exist
independently of all questions of treatment," as the Official Solicitor ar-
gued?71 This should then be balanced with the Roman Catholic position
that there are limits on what must be done to prolong life.7 2
In holding that nutrition and hydration are part of medical treat-
ment, the lords relied on "the overwhelming verdict of informed medical
opinion worldwide."73 The lords acknowledged that the law of common
law jurisdictions holds that "therapy and life-supporting care, including
sophisticated methods of artificial feeding are components of medical
treatment and cannot be separated" as the Official Solicitor contended.74
The traditional Roman Catholic division of treatment into extraordi-
nary and ordinary is significant in Bland. "Ordinary means" are those
which are effective and can be employed without undue burden.75 "Ex-
traordinary means" are those which either are futile or whose use in-
volves too grave a burden.76 The distinction is sometimes made between
artificial and natural means of life support. No one may reject natural
means of life support, those necessary to sustain life in every situation-
air, warmth, food, and water. Artificial means of providing support,
however, have to be assessed. Artificial means are those employed be-
cause of some incapacity in the patient. They may be surgical, technical,
or chemical, such as a catheter, ventilator, feeding tubes, or drugs. They,
too, must be employed unless it is shown that they are useless or if the
burden in using them or living with them is too great.77 The case of
70 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 378.
71 Id.
72 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 378.
74 Id.
75 See Texas Bishops, supra note 66, at 53, 55 n.2 (quoting Pope Pius XII, supra note 66, at
393-98.
76 Id. at 54.
77 Id. at 55 n.3 (citing Declaration on Euthanasia IV); see also Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de
Quebec, 86 D.L.R. 4th at 385 (holding that patient suffering from Guillain-Barre syndrome,
an incurable neurological disorder leaving her incapable of movement, had the right to
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Nancy B., discussed in subpart I(A), illustrates this latter point. She was
not prepared to live her life totally dependent on a respirator and chose
to forego use of it.
It has been found that, when people are extremely ill or dying, there
is often a natural movement against food and drink-even in their ordi-
nary forms. Mouth-moistening is all that is required for comfort. There-
fore, to say that one must always provide food and drink is obviously
incorrect. Accordingly, the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration
is not an absolute value and can be rightly seen as medical treatment-
or at least as part of medical care-which can be refused.
D. Continuation of Life-Sustaining Measures When the Underlying
Pathology Cannot Be Cured
The lords noted that, "where the doctor's treatment of his patient is
lawful, then the patient's death will be regarded in law as exclusively
caused by the injury or disease to which his condition is attributable."78
Therefore, a question arises regarding whether the person should con-
tinue to be sustained indefinitely. In Bland, the lords relied on the prin-
ciple of best interests.7 9 If treatment is considered futile, then continu-
ing treatment is not considered to be in the best interests of the patient.
The doctors are then under no further legal obligation to provide treat-
ment.8 o The nature of the question being asked at this stage is para-
have life support stopped). In Nancy B., the court noted that a patient's right to consent to
or refuse treatment was limited only by the rights of others and applicable laws which
sometimes prevents people from doing what they wish with their bodies. Id.
78 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 370.
79 Id. at 361. Lord Keith stated that "[t]he fundamental question then comes to be
whether continuance of the present regime of treatment and care, more than three years
after the injuries that resulted in the P.V.S., would confer any benefit on Anthony Bland."
Id. Lord Goff placed great emphasis on the proper foundation of the issue at hand. Accord-
ing to Lord Goff, "[tihe question is whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his
life should be prolonged by the continuance of this form of treatment or care." Id. at 371.
Lord Lowry argued that "the court.., ought to give weight to informed medical opinion...
on the question of what is in the best interests of a patient." Id. at 378-79. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson announced that "the critical decision to be made is whether it is in the best
interests of Anthony Bland to continue the invasive medical care involved in artificial feed-
ing." Id. at 383. Finally, in upholding the declarations to cease treatment for Bland, Lord
Mustill held that "his best interests in being kept alive have also disappeared, taking with
them the justification for the non-consensual regime and the co-relative duty to keep it in
being." Id.
80 See Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 362 (stating that "a medical practitioner is under no duty to
continue to treat . . . a patient where a large body of informed and responsible medical
opinion is to the effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance"); see also id.
at 370 (noting that a doctor caring for a terminally ill patient is not "under an absolute
obligation to prolong his life by any means available to him, regardless of the quality of the
patient's life"); id. at 379 ("[I]f it is not in the interests of an insentient patient to continue
the life-supporting care and treatment, the doctor would be acting unlawfully if he contin-
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mount: whether it is in the best interests of the person that his or her life
be prolonged by continuance of this form of medical treatment.8 1
Lord Goff noted that four major safeguards must be observed before
discontinuing life support. These safeguards were recommended in Dis-
cussion Paper on Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative State, a
document issued in September 1992 by the Medical Ethics Committee of
the British Medical Association. 2 The guidelines provide that (i) every
effort should be made at rehabilitation for at least six months; (ii) diag-
nosis of irreversible PVS should not be considered confirmed until at
least twelve months after injury; (iii) the diagnosis should be agreed on
by two other independent doctors; and (iv) the wishes of the patient's
immediate family should generally be given some weight.
8 3
The law lords recognized help from decisions in a number of Ameri-
can jurisdictions addressing when it is lawful to discontinue life-prolong-
ing treatment in the case of PVS patients, and in particular noted the
publication Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment.8 4
Their views add weight to what Lord Goff termed "a community of view
on the legal principles applicable in cases of discontinuing life support
.. in the course of development and acceptance throughout the common
law world.""5 This stress on legal principles shows that the decision to
discontinue treatment cannot be made by the medical profession alone.
When the doctors made a decision that treatment was futile, this in-
volved the realization that they were no longer under any obligation to
ued the care and treatment and would perform no guilty act by discontinuing... ."); id. at
385 (holding that there is no duty to maintain patient's life if such maintenance is no
longer in best interests of patient .... ); id. at 398 (arguing that once patient's best interests
of being kept alive are gone, there is no justification or duty to continue treatment).
81 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 373 (citing MEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE BRITISH MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE
STATE (1992).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 375 (citing Working Paper No. 28 of the Law of Reform Commission of Cases,
Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment (1982)). Lord Goff cited In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 949 (Me. 1987), for the proposition that declaratory judgments are
appropriate for questions addressing whether "those who discontinue [artificial] life sup-
port.. . will commit a civil wrong or criminal offense.'Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 366. Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), was referred to for its for holding that
when "an adult patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treat-
ment or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his
care must give effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best
interests to do so." Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 367. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976),
and Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977), were utilized to provide support for the "substituted judgment test" in order to ascer-
tain whether artificial life support may be ceased. Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 374.
85 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 375.
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continue treatment. Their decision included the medical diagnosis, prog-
nosis, and ethical concern that there would be no benefit to Bland in
keeping him alive. The ethical component of their decision left the ques-
tion of discontinuance open to the agreement of his family or to approval
by the courts. This was necessary because of the ethical dimension of the
question-whether the patient benefits simply in being kept alive. The
medical profession had no special jurisdiction in this area. Taking the
doctors' judgment of futility into account, the lords had to ask whether it
was indeed in the best interests of Bland to continue such treatment. In
the absence of even "glimmerings of awareness" on Bland's part, they
came to the conclusion that there was no reason why he should be kept
alive; his being kept alive would be forever unknown to him and would
neither benefit nor burden him. Therefore, keeping Bland alive was fu-
tile, except as an exercise in prolonging biological life.
As outlined above, the wishes of the family must be taken into con-
sideration, and all decisions must be taken within the recommended
guidelines to ensure that the ethical decision is properly made. In this
instance, Bland's family agreed with his doctors that treatment should
be discontinued.
8 6
E. The Meaning of the "Omission" of Treatment & the "Intending" of
Death
Most of the law lords referred to the distinction in criminal law be-
tween an act of commission and an act of omission.8 7 Since intention is
the main factor in establishing the mens rea for a criminal act, they
noted that there is no difference between performing an act meant to kill
or seriously harm and omitting to act with the same intention.
8 8
Some of the lords questioned the difference between allowing Bland
to die and giving him a lethal injection to end his life quickly.8 9 Lord
Brown-Wilkinson also noted the distinction between the omission of an
act and the omission of an act which the actor was duty-bound to pro-
vide. The failure to act is not considered an actus reus necessary for a
86 Id. at 360.
87 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 368, 383, 394.
88 See id. at 383 (stating that "[as] to the element ofintention or mens rea, in my judgment
there can be no real doubt that it is present in this case: the whole purpose of stopping
artificial feeding is to bring about the death of Anthony Bland").
89 Lord Goff stated "that the law draws a crucial distinction between cases in which a
doctor decides not to provide ... for his patient [sic] treatment .... and those in which he
decides, for example by administering a lethal drug, actively to bring his patient's life to an
end." Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 368. Lord Lowry noted that, in withholding treatment, "the in-
tention to bring about the patient's death is there." Id. at 37. Lord Browne-Wilkinson
questioned whether the withdrawal of life support was murder, "notwithstanding the best
motives from which everyone concerned is acting." Id. at 383.
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homicide conviction.9 ° Thus, the legal outcome turns on whether or not
an obligation to the patient exists. If it does not exist, the doctor is not in
breach of any obligation to maintain the person's life and, therefore, is
not guilty of a criminal omission. In Bland, it was held that a duty did
not extend to Bland because treatment was found to be futile.9 1
From a moral point of view, a distinction is also made between com-
mission and omission. However, one can intend death equally through
commission and omission. This would be true of omission in the case of
not acting when there is a duty to act. When there is no duty to act (or,
indeed, a duty not to act), then agents are not the cause of death and do
not intend death because they did not employ means to bring death
about even if they omitted to use means which could prolong life.
Some moral theologians distinguish between "intending" and "will-
ing" death. Death may be "willed" when an agent views a patient's death
as a positive event, such as a relief from suffering. How often has it been
said that one is grateful that death came to a loved one suffering from
great pain? That person's death was willed but certainly not intended.
That is the difference.
In Bland, the law lords did not make use of this distinction. Inten-
tion in legal terms is determined by the agent's obligation to act in any
given situation. If there is no obligation to act, then an agent is not
guilty of criminal behavior. It is submitted that the intending-willing
distinction could help clarify the commission-omission distinction. Some
of the lords spoke of "the intention to kill" Bland by omission. 2 The law
lords could have held that the doctors in Bland were not the cause of
Bland's death by omission since they were under no obligation to act and,
therefore, they did not intend his death.9 3 The application of the term
"willing" death shows that the decision to allow Bland to die is very dif-
ferent from "intending" to end his life and is more than a matter of se-
mantics. The distinction between willing death and intending death ob-
viously needs serious reconsideration in law to avoid confusion about
"intention."
In this case, the lords decided that Bland would not benefit from con-
tinued medical treatment and, therefore, withholding treatment was jus-
90 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 383 (citing Rex v. Gibbons and Proctor, 13 Cr. App. R. 134 (1918),
and Rey v. Stone, (1977) Q.B. 354).
91 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 364 (quoting Glanville Williams, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 282 (2d
ed. 1983) (arguing that, when a doctor turns off a life support machine, this is "'not an act
but an omission'.. . and... 'the omission is not a breach of duty by the doctor, because he
is not obliged to continue in a hopeless case.'").
92 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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tifiable. a 4 Bland was to be allowed to die. Lord Goff captured this differ-
ence when he wrote that "the law draws a crucial distinction between
cases in which a doctor decides not to provide, or to continue to provide,
for his patient treatment or care which could or might prolong his life,
and those in which he decides, for example by administering a lethal
drug, actively to bring his patient's life to an end.""5 The difference is
that, although doctors are not obliged to continue treatment in a hope-
less case and may allow the patient to die, they are not allowed to termi-
nate the patient's life out of pity. The latter is not part of a doctor's duty.
Although the legal situation could change if the law changes, morally the
distinction will remain.
CONCLUSION
Ethicists such as Anthony Fisher claim that the decision made in
Bland is tantamount to "medically killing by judicial fiat."96 An analysis
of the case shows that the court did not condone euthanasia, but rather
made a distinction between killing and allowing to die. Some of the judg-
ments in the House of Lords indicate that euthanasia is likely to be one
of the next challenges to the Courts of England.97 The lords consider
this to be a matter for Parliament and are divided in their approach to
it. 9 8
If the House of Lords had paid more attention to the concept of "will-
ing" rather than "intending" they would have made the "letting one die"
approach clearer and would have made a useful contribution to the de-
veloping international body of law on this topic. The distinction between
"killing" and "letting one die" must be honed so that it becomes the major
94 See, e.g., Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 362 (holding that "a medical practitioner is under no duty to
continue to treat such a patient when a large body of informed and responsible medical
opinion is to the effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance"); id. at 372
(stating "that no such duty rests upon the respondents, or upon Dr. Howe, in the case of
Anthony Bland, whose condition is in reality no more than a living death, and for whom
such treatment or care would, in medical terms be futile"); id. at 386 (concluding that,
because there is no affirmative benefit to Anthony Bland in continued life support, the
doctors are "neither entitled nor under a duty to continue such medical care"); id. at 389
(arguing that, because "Anthony Bland has no further interest in being kept alive, the ne-
cessity to do so, created by his inability to make a choice has gone and the justification for
the invasive care and treatment, together with the duty to provide it has also gone").
95 Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 368.
96 Anthony Fisher OP, On Not Starving the Unconscious, 74 NEw BLAcKIA.RS 130 (1993).
97 See, e.g., Bland, 2 W.L.R. at 388 (noting similarity between euthanasia and cessation of
life support).
98 See, e.g., id. at 380 (stating that "it is for Parliament, not the courts, to decide the
broader issues which this case raises"); id. at 382 ("For these reasons, it seems ... impera-
tive that the moral, social and legal issues raised by this case should be considered by
Parliament."); id. at 392 ("The whole matter cries out for exploration in depth by Parlia-
ment . . ").
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focal point in future cases. Lawyers, ethicists, theologians, and doctors
must refine and redefine the concepts of intending, willing, and omitting
in order that this distinction, already a part of established Roman Catho-
lic medical ethics, might be further clarified.

